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Abstract 
 
The German corporate governance system differs significantly from the South African system. Unlike the shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance system that exists in the South Africa, German corporate governance is stakeholder-oriented. 
Stakeholders, particularly employees, have an important role in German corporate governance. They participate in decisions 
that affect them directly through workers councils, as well as those that affect the corporation through union representation on 
the supervisory board. The German corporate governance system is characterized by the two-tier board, with co-determination 
between employees and shareholders on the supervisory board. This paper examines the German stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance. The main concern is whether there are lessons to be drawn from the German model of corporate 
governance that may influence corporate law reform in South Africa. The paper concludes that for the effective protection of 
stakeholders’ interests, the German two-tier board structure and co-determination provisions should be adopted in South Africa 
with some variation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The German corporate governance system differs significantly from the South African system. Unlike the shareholder-
oriented corporate governance system1 that exists in the South Africa, German corporate governance is stakeholder-
oriented. Stakeholders, particularly employees, have an important role in German corporate governance. They participate 
in decisions that affect them directly through workers councils, as well as those that affect the corporation through union 
representation on the supervisory board. The German corporate governance system is characterized by the two-tier 
(management and supervisory) board, with co-determination between employees and shareholders on the supervisory 
board.2 This paper examines the German stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. The aim is extract lessons for 
South Africa that may influence corporate law reform. 
 
2. Germany 
 
According to Mintz, German corporate governance is shaped by a legal tradition that dates back to the 1920s and 
regards companies as entities which act not only in the interests of their shareholders, but also serve other stakeholder 
interests. 3  German companies place their employees in particular, at par with the shareholders. The stakeholder 
corporate governance approach in Germany is characterized by its two-tier board structure and its system of co-
determination.4 
                                                                            
1 The shareholder-oriented corporate governance system is said to be operative in Anglo-American jurisdictions although there are many 
who feel that some of these jurisdictions are moving towards more of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance. This is due to a 
number of factors, one of which is the advent of the concept of the enlightened shareholder value approach in the United Kingdom, 
which has been adopted in South Africa.  
2 This system is concerned with the long-term success of the company, and was developed for reasons of social governance, protection 
of public interest as extending beyond shareholders and to reduce employee alienation. 
3  Mintz M, “Imrpoving Corporate Governance Systems: A Stakeholder Theory Approach” available at http://aaahq.org/AM2004/cpe 
/Ethics/Forum_08.pdf, accessed on 18 August 2012. 
4 The modern concept of co-determination goes back to 1919, in particular, the Weimar Constitution 1919 Article 165 which stated, 
“Workers and staff are appointed to participate with equal rights together with the company in the regulation of wages and working 
conditions, as well as in the complete economic development of the producing powers.” This was the impetus for laws on co-
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2.1 The Two-Tier Board Structure 
 
According to the German Stock Corporations Act,5 a mandatory two-tiered board structure must be established in certain 
corporations. The German Stock Corporations Act, makes it mandatory for all German stock corporations,6 all other 
business entities with more than five hundred employees and all firms in the iron, steel and mining industries (regardless 
of their size) to have two boards, the management board7 and the supervisory board.8 The management board runs the 
day-to-day operation of the company. It is responsible for independently managing the enterprise in the interest of the 
enterprise, thus taking into account the interests of the shareholders, its employees and other stakeholders, with the 
objective of sustainable creation of value.9 The supervisory board appoints, supervises and advises the members of the 
management board and is directly involved in decisions of fundamental importance to the enterprise.10Simultaneous 
membership of the management board and the supervisory board is not permitted in order to protect the independence of 
both the management board and the supervisory board.  
German legislation strictly separates the functions of the supervisory board and the management board to allow for 
the creation of optimum effectiveness. In this way, the supervisory board closely scrutinizes the performance of the 
management board. Thus, the interests of the employees will not be neglected. Germans appear to believe that 
companies have a human and personal component to them and will produce a general benefit for the company as a 
whole.11 The underlying ideology is that employee participation in the decision-making will promote trust, co-operation 
and harmony.12 Thus, the German two-tier board system encourages employees to participate in the decision-making 
process. By so doing, it produces a compromise in management between shareholders and employees, and balances 
the pursuit of short-term profit with social-justice considerations and long-term strategic planning.13 
 
2.2 Co-determination 
 
Germany has a consensual approach to corporate decision making and encourages labour participation by treating 
employees as key stakeholders. By participating directly in corporate decision making, employees have some degree of 
influence and control within the corporation. The word ‘co-determination,’ or ‘Mitbestimmung’ in German, refers to a 
concept for employee consultation and participation in company decisions. The ideology of co-determination is that labour 
and capital have equal importance and therefore should have an equal voice in running the company. In other words, 
employees are as much a part of the company as are shareholders. The objectives of co-determination are inter alia to 
ensure equality between providers of capital and providers of labour, to promote democracy in the economy and to 
promote social development.14 Co-determination also aims to promote adequate control of economic power. Where 
economic power congregates, control is an important instrument in avoiding its misuse. Whether participating in company 
decisions or contributing on company matters, the principle is the same in every case: co-determination means co-
responsibility. In works councils and supervisory boards the employees, just like the employer, need to keep an eye on 
the long term development of the company. This is why all of the laws on co-determination are directed towards enabling 
fruitful co-operation between both sides and creating a productive balance of interests.  
The Co-determination Act of 1976 provides for the proportion of employee and shareholder representatives on the 
supervisory board. In terms of this Act, half of the seats on the Supervisory Board of all companies with more than two 
thousand employees and all companies in the iron, steel and mining industries (regardless of their size) must be filled by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
determination. The Nazi Regime in 1934 passed the “Act to Regulate National Work” (Gesetz zur Ordnung der Nationalen Arbeit). This 
law repealed the Works Council Act of 1920. As a result, provision for works councils and worker participation on the supervisory board 
came to an end. The current system of employee participation in corporate governance arose out of the aftermath of World War II. 
5 German Stock Corporations Act 1965 (Aktiengesetz - AktG) 
6 In German, these are known as Actiengesellschaft(AG). 
7 In German it is called the ‘Vorstand.’ 
8 In German it is called the ‘Aufsichtsrat.’ 
9 The German Corporate Governance Code 2013 6. 
10 The German Corporate Governance Code 2013 2. 
11  Wei Y, “Comparative Corporate Governance A Chinese Perspective, Global Trade and FinanceSeries,” 2003 (3) Kluwer Law 
International 2. 
12 Lutter M“The German System of Worker Participation in Practice” 1982 Journal of Business Law 154. 
13 Clarke and Bostock, “Governance in Germany: The foundations of Corporate Structure?” In: Corporate Governance by Keasey (1997) 
233 241. 
14  Through a better consideration of employees’ interests when making establishment and company decisions, co-determination 
contributes to the improvement of working people’s living and working conditions. 
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representatives of employees or the trade union.15 The Chairperson of the supervisory board, whose vote counts double 
in the case of a tie, is elected by shareholders, however. The proportion of employee representatives falls to one third in 
companies with less than two thousand but more than five hundred employees.16 
The main effect of the Co-determination Act is that requiring fair employee representation on the supervisory board 
forces direct negotiation and resolution of employee-based concerns. Traditionally, these concerns centered on 
conditions of employment and salary increases, but they could also reach broader issues, such as community support 
and environmental concerns. It is however questionable whether employees do have a stronger inclination to consider 
the community or the environment than shareholders or management generally. While this may be difficult to assert, one 
thing that is certain is that where workers live in a community, they would most likely be concerned with corporate policies 
that adversely affect the community.  
 
2.3 The German Corporate Governance Code 2013 
 
The German Corporate Governance Code, as amended on 13 May 2013, aims to make the German corporate 
governance system transparent.17 Its purpose is to promote the trust of international and national investors, customers, 
employees and the general public in the management and supervision of listed German stock corporations.18 The 
recommendations of the Code are identified by the use of the word “shall.” Companies can deviate from them, but are 
then obliged to disclose this annually and to justify the deviations (comply or explain).19 The Code therefore contributes to 
more flexibility and more self-regulation in the German corporate constitution. Furthermore, the Code contains 
suggestions which can be deviated from without disclosure; for this the Code uses the term "should."20 Primarily, the 
Code addresses listed companies though it is recommended that all companies respect the Code. 
The Code promotes co-operation between the management board and the supervisory board. It clarifies the 
obligation of the management board and the supervisory board to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and 
its sustainable creation of value in conformity with the principles of the social market economy.21 The Code highlights the 
fact that good corporate governance requires an open discussion between the management board and supervisory board 
as well as among the members within the management board and the supervisory board.22 
 
3. South Africa – The Unitary Board Structure  
 
South African company law provides for a unitary board structure.23 This board structure entrusts both management and 
control in the hands of the board of directors, who are ultimately vested with universal powers. Section 66(1) of the 
Companies Act provides that the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its 
board, which has the authority to exercise all the powers and perform any functions of the company, except to the extent 
that the Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise. The board is therefore, the focal point of 
the corporate governance system.24 It gives strategic direction to the company.25 While the board may reserve specific 
                                                                            
15 Clarke and Bostock, “Governance in Germany: The foundations of Corporate Structure?” In: Corporate Governance by Keasey (1997) 
233 238. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The German Corporate Governance Code 2013 1 available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/kodex_2013 
/D_CorGov_final_May_2013.pdf, accessed on 27 June 2013. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The German Corporate Governance Code 2013 2. 
20 Ibid. 
21 The German Corporate Governance Code 2013 2. 
22 The German Corporate Governance Code 2013 4. 
23 Unitary board structure is one in terms of which the company has only one board of directors consisting of both executive and non-
executive directors. 
24 King III Principle 2.1 29. In R v Kritzinger 1971 (2) SA 57 (A) the point was made that a company is an artificial person that cannot 
read a written representation or hear a spoken representation. It reads or hears a representation through the eyes or ears of, inter alia, 
its directors acting in the course of their duty, and “board” is the collective term used to designate the directors when they act together in 
the course of their duty to the company.  
25 King III paragraph 5 29. 
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powers to it and delegate to other levels of management other matters with the necessary written authority,26 any such 
delegations by the board must have due regard for the director’s statutory and common law duties to the company, while 
taking into account strategic and operational effectiveness and efficiencies. Although the board may delegate authority, 
there is an important distinction between a delegation and an abdication of powers. In other words, delegating authority to 
management or board committees does not in any way mitigate or dissipate the discharge by the board and its directors 
of their duties and responsibilities.27 Board committees are an aid to assist the board and its members in discharging their 
duties and responsibilities, and boards cannot shield behind these committees.  
With regard to the board of directors, critics may argue that one area that needs special attention is the method by 
which directors are appointed. It is important to note that in a formal sense, a company’s shareholders elect the directors 
and have to vote separately on each candidate28 but as a practical matter the shareholders usually simply ratify a list of 
recommended candidates. Traditionally, the chairman29 of the board decided who would be nominated and he chose 
people whom he knew. It was also common for the chairman to be the company’s top executive, often referred to as the 
Chief Executive Officer.30 Correspondingly, in many instances a company’s leading manager in effect selected the 
individuals who were charged with the task of monitoring managerial performance. Since individual directors tend to be 
loyal to those who arrange for their appointment, whenever a single individual is a company’s chairman of the board and 
CEO, doubts about bias understandably can arise.31 
The difficulty posed by managers appointing their own monitors has diminished recently in South Africa. This is 
because it has become standard practice in companies to split the roles of the CEO and chairman.32 The other reason is 
that it is becoming common for a nominating committee composed of outside directors to carry out the task of finding new 
board members. Be that as it may, one may argue that objectivity is still far from assured. This is so because in 
companies with nominating committees, the CEO can often continue to play a significant ‘behind the scenes’ role in 
selecting nominees. Also, when there is a CEO-chairman split, relations between a company’s chairman and the chief 
executive officer are usually close and collegial in nature. Part of the reason is that it is reasonably common for the 
chairman to work on a full time basis for the company33 or to be the company’s former CEO34 and a supporter of his 
appointed successor.35 In addition, friction between a chairman and the CEO can paralyze the management team and 
rob a company of its sense of direction.36 Assuming a strong working relationship does exist, the chairman will probably 
consult with the CEO about the nomination process and he will in any case seek to nominate individuals to the board who 
‘fit in’ with the company. These will be people who will identify with the company’s goals and methods of operation and 
are compatible with the management team. Thus, despite some changes which affect the manner in which directors are 
selected, doubts about bias must remain. 
 
                                                                            
26  King III paragraph 49-50 36. See also Section 72 of the Companies Act which provides that, except to the extent that the 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise, the board of directors may appoint any number of board committees, and it may 
delegate any of the authority of the boards to a committee. 
27 See section 72(3) of the Companies Act which states that the board of directors or the particular director will remain liable for the 
proper performance of a director’s duty despite the delegation of the duty to a committee. 
28 See section 70 of the Companies Act. 
29 The term ‘chairman’ also used in King III has been used as an indication of the office of the individual who heads a company’s board 
of directors rather than ‘chairperson’ which has, in an attempt to be gender neutral become fairly common.  
30 Hereafter, CEO. 
31 Demb A and Neubauer FF,“The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes” 1992 (25)3Long Range Planning 12, available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0024630192903648, accessed on 10 April 2011; Cox JD and Munsinger HL “Bias in the 
Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion” (1985) 48 Law and Contemp. Problems 83 91-
99.  
32 The King Committee’s recommendation that the functions of the chief executive officer and the chairman of a company should be 
separated – see King III Principle 2. 16 34 has been enforced by the market in respect of all companies listed on the JSE. It has also 
been recommended that the chairman should preferably be an independent non-executive director – see King III Principle 2. 16 34. 
33 King III however recommends that the board should elect a chairman of the board who is an independent non-executive director – see 
King III Principle 2.16 34.King III further recommends that if the board appoints a chairman who is a non-executive director but is not 
independent or is an executive director, this should be disclosed in the integrated report, together with the reasons and justifications for 
the appointment – see King III paragraph 39 34. 
34 According to King III, the retired CEO should not become the chairman of the board until three years have passed since the end of the 
CEO’s tenure as an executive director – see King III paragraph 42 35. 
35 Clutterbuck D and Waine P The Independent Board Director (1993) 41. 
36 On the importance of a good working relationship, see Walters P “The Role of the Chairman and Chief Executive: An Industrialist’s 
View” in Sheikh S and Rees W (eds) Corporate Governance and Corporate Control (1995) 213-216. 
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4. Commentary 
 
The unitary board system can be seen as a mechanism geared to further the interests of shareholders as stakeholders 
are given very little or no recognition nor representation to ensure some form of protection and furtherance of their 
interests. It for instance, fails to provide key stakeholders with rights enabling them to engage in the decision-making 
processes of the company at an adequate level. ‘Key stakeholders’ refers to stakeholders collectively, with legitimate 
interests in the business, stakeholders that merit and receive consideration in business decisions. Each company will 
have a different set of key stakeholders, depending on its core business. A socially responsible business should attend to 
the legitimate interests of all of its key stakeholders and also act in their interest. Key stakeholders, like shareholders, 
contribute to the success of the company. Shareholders contribute financial capital and the contribution of key 
stakeholders comes in different forms, depending on the nature of the stakeholder group. For instance, employees 
contribute "skill, time and effort"(or human capital).37  
Given that key stakeholders are investors in a company, and if we are to accept the premise of the stakeholder 
approach,38 then there is perhaps a strong argument to be advanced for the equal treatment of key stakeholders and 
shareholders. In this regard, it is submitted that the German based two-tier board structure and its co-determination 
provisions are most effective in ensuring the protection of stakeholders’ interests. It is however, noted that it is only to the 
extent that stakeholder questions are questions about employee interests, that the German system would seem to 
provide an example of progressive stakeholder legislation. In light of the fact that large companies have stakeholders 
other than their employees and shareholders, it is fair to inquire whether the German model is responsive to the interests 
of those other stakeholders. For instance, if a German mining company is considering commencing mining operations in 
a particular community, to what extent would those community interests get a fair hearing before the corporate decision 
makers? It is submitted that by excluding other relevant stakeholders from representation on the supervisory board, the 
German system protects employees to the exclusion of all other stakeholders.  
 
5. Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
Key stakeholders in a company are interested in the outcome of decisions that affect them directly and indirectly. They 
have an important role in corporate governance. Key stakeholders need to participate in corporate governance in order to 
ensure the success of the company39 and to protect their stake in the company. This is achieved through their power to 
influence decision making over certain aspects of the company's activities. The strongest form of stakeholder 
participation, under a stakeholder oriented corporate governance system, is board representation, whereby key 
stakeholder representatives sit on the company's board of directors. In this regard, two recommendations are made. First, 
it is recommended that the German based two-tier board structure be adopted in South Africa. In this regard, the 
Companies Act should be amended to include the following provision: 
66A Two-Tier Board Structure 
(1) This provision applies to –  
a) all companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; 
b) all companies with more than five hundred employees; and  
c) all companies in the mining sector regardless of their size. 
(2) A company to which this provision applies must have two boards, the management board mandated with 
the running of the day-to-day operations of the company and the supervisory board whose core function 
will be to appoint, supervise and advise the members of the management board and will also be directly 
involved in decisions of fundamental importance to the company.  
(3) Simultaneous membership of the management board and the supervisory board is prohibited. 
Secondly, it is recommended that the German based co-determination laws be adopted with some variation in the 
Companies Act. The Companies Act should provide for the proportion of not only employee and shareholder 
representatives on the supervisory board as in Germany but of shareholders and all key stakeholders’ representatives of 
a company. Furthermore, unlike in Germany where the chairperson of the supervisory board, whose vote counts double 
                                                                            
37 Greenfield K, “The Place of Workers in Corporate Law” (1998) 39 B.C.L. Rev. 283. 
38 The stakeholder approach is based on the premise that each group of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not 
merely because of its ability to further the interests of some groups, such as shareholders. 
39 The success of the company effectively protects stakeholders’ interests and it should be expected that key stakeholders have a right 
to some influence over decision making to ensure that their interests are adequately protected. 
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in the case of a tie, is elected by shareholders, it is recommended that in the South African context, the chairperson be 
appointed by members of the supervisory board. In this regard, and in line with the previous recommendation, the 
Companies Act should be amended to include the following provision: 
66B Composition of the Supervisory Board 
(1) A company to which the two-tier board structure in terms of section 66A applies, shall have half the seats 
on the supervisory board being held by shareholders and the other half being held by representatives of 
all key stakeholders of the company in equal proportion. 
(2) The Chairperson of the supervisory board, whose vote counts double in the case of a tie, is elected 
members of the supervisory board. 
The main effect of the above recommended provisions would be that the Companies Act, by requiring certain 
companies to have a two-tier board structure and a fair key stakeholder representation on the supervisory board, forces 
direct negotiation and resolution of stakeholders’ concerns. It would encourage key stakeholders’ to participate in the 
decision-making process of the company. By permitting key stakeholders to participate in corporate decision making, they 
are able to individually participate in ensuring the success of the company and the protection of their interests. It is 
therefore, important for key stakeholders to have a role in corporate governance and the ability to participate in the 
decision making of the company. 
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